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Introduction 
When it comes to development, Indonesia is a country of contradictions. For years, Indonesia 
has been developing uneven, creating substantial disparities between regions, with 
development mainly located in the Western regions (Aritenang, 2008, p.1). After years of 
authoritarian centralized governance by Sukarno and Suharto, a drastic reformation took place 
in 1999; through democratization and decentralization, extensive powers were devolved to the 
regional governments causing new power struggles to emerge (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, p.1). 
Local governments gained new responsibilities in education, health, labour, public works, 
natural resource management and the environment (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, p.4). Moreover, 
the reformation intended to give the resource rich provinces, such as East Kalimantan and 
Papua, a larger share of the profit made from natural resources (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, p.8). 
However, the reformation did not come without problems, with some being: incapable local 
administrations, growing inequality between regions, and worsening corruption (Aspinall & 
Fealy, 2003, p.5). Out of the 34 provinces, Papua and East Kalimantan are both located in 
Indonesia’s periphery, and among the biggest provinces geographically. Moreover, both 
provinces are very rich in natural resources and have large mining sectors. East Kalimantan is 
rich in oil, natural gas, timber resources, minerals, and is the largest coal-producing region of 
Indonesia (Tadjoeddin, 2007, p.20). Papua is abundant in oil, copper, gold, natural gas, 
timber, petroleum, minerals, and has one of the largest gold and copper mines in the world 
(Brown, 2004, p.189). However, there is a large discrepancy in the development of both 
provinces. The Human Development Index (HDI) measures a country’s development. It 
measures the average achievement of three components: 1) life expectancy at birth; 2) 
education; and 3) Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2016). The average HDI in Indonesia is 70.18. When compared at a regional 
level, there are large differences. East Kalimantan has a higher than average HDI of 75.12, 
which makes it the third most developed province after Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Papua on the 
other hand, is the least developed region of Indonesia with a HDI of 59.09 (Badan Pusat 
Statistik [BPS], 2017). Thus, life expectancy at birth, education levels and gross national 
income per capita is significantly higher in East Kalimantan than in Papua. If both provinces 
share so many similarities in natural resources, location and size, where does this divergence 
come from? Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: why is East Kalimantan more 
developed than Papua? 
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  A lot of theories aim to explain different outcomes of development between 
continents, regions, countries and provinces. One paradigm is that of institutionalism, which 
names institutions as an important factor in development and underdevelopment (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012; ). Acemoglu & Robinson differentiate between extractive institutions and 
inclusive institutions. Inclusive institutions lead to development, while extractive institutions 
lead to underdevelopment (2012). Inclusive institutions have a sufficient degree of 
centralization and pluralism, and when one of these conditions is missing, that institution is 
extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.81). If institutions drive or block development, 
then Papua and East Kalimantan are an interesting regional comparison to investigate whether 
their institutions show differences. Can Acemoglu & Robinson’s theory account for the 
divergence in development between East Kalimantan and Papua? 
The thesis is structured as followed: chapter 1 provides the theoretical framework. 
Chapter 2 describes the methodology used to carry out the research. The case studies will be 
described in chapter 3, after which chapter 4 shall follow with a conclusion of the main 
findings. 
1. Theoretical Framework 
 
A lot of different theories have tried to explain variations in development (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012; Diamond, 1997; Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999; Robbins, 1935; Weber, 
2002). One of the major paradigms on development is the geography theory (Diamond, 1997; 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999). According to Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, geographical 
location and climate have significant effects on income levels and economic growth (Gallup, 
Sachs and Mellinger, 1999). Tropical regions experience low development due to higher 
disease burdens and constraints on agriculture, and coastal regions have a development 
advantage over hinterlands, while landlocked economies have a disadvantage due to their lack 
of access to the sea (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1999, pp.5-6). However, this theory does not 
hold explanatory power considering the different levels of development in Papua and East 
Kalimantan despite their close proximity and similar geographical characteristics. They both 
have a predominantly tropical rainforest climate and coastal areas with sea climate (Climate-
Data, 2012).  
Another influential theory that explains development, and possible disparities, is 
institutionalist theory (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Bessley & Persson, 2011; Easterly, 
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2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes & Schleifer, 2008; North,1991; Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi, 2004). One of the seminal contributions is made by Acemoglu and Robinson, who 
explain development through differences in economic and political institutions (2012). They 
argue that political institutions determine the political process, which in turn determines the 
economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.42). Inclusive economic institutions 
allow and encourage participation in economic activities, and foster technological 
improvements and education (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.77).  For this, they need to 
have property rights, an unbiased system of law, public services providing a level playing 
field, and the freedom to contract and exchange (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.75). In order 
to enforce this, a state needs a degree of centralization and the monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.80). When political institutions are sufficiently 
centralized and pluralistic, they can be defined as inclusive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
p.324). Pluralistic political institutions distribute power widely in society and subject it to 
constraints (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.80). Thus, inclusive political institutions have 
two necessary conditions: pluralism and state capacity. When one of these conditions are not 
met, the institutions are extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.81).  
 
Inclusive institutions emerge and persist through the virtuous circle: “a powerful 
process of positive feedback that preserves these institutions in the face of attempts at 
undermining them and, in fact, sets in motion forces that lead to greater inclusiveness” 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.308). The mechanism of the virtuous circle is that inclusive 
institutions are based on constraints on the exercise of power and widely distributed political 
power, enforced by the rule of law (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.308). The virtuous circle 
arises because of these factors, which leads to a more equal income distribution, a more level 
playing field and the empowerment of a broad section of the society. This in turn constraints 
how much power one person can usurp, and reduces incentives to go back to extractive 
political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.309). Thus, constraints on power, 
pluralism and the rule of law are important factors to ensure inclusive political and economic 
institutions.  
 
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, extractive political and economic institutions 
are the root causes of underdevelopment (2012, p.372). They use the notion of the “vicious 
circle” to explain that extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, 
because it enriches a small elite, who therefore have the resources to keep the system 
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extractive and remain in power (for example through corruption or repression) (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, p.343). Extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic 
institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.343). Extractive economic institutions do not 
create incentives to save, invest or innovate (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.372). Moreover, 
extractive political institutions support the extractive economic institutions, because they 
secure the power of the elite that benefits from the extraction (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
p.372). The lack of defense against power abuses by the elite in extractive systems creates a 
vicious circle (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.344). Because extractive institutions create 
unconstrained power for a few and great income inequality, the stakes of the political game 
increase (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.344). 
 
Additionally, Acemoglu & Robinson acknowledge that economic growth is possible 
under extractive institutions (2012, p.94). However, this economic growth will not be 
sustainable, since it is not accompanied by technological innovation and creative destruction 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.94). For economic growth under extractive institutions, the 
degree of political centralization and political power is crucial, because the elite needs it to 
defend their assets and political power and coordinate economic activity (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, p.94). Economic growth in extractive institutions is fragile, because the 
concentration of wealth and power it generates creates a tendency of infighting over it 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.95). According to Acemoglu & Robinson, this type of 
growth is unsustainable: the economic prosperity will eventually undermine the foundation is 
was based on, unless the political institutions transform to inclusive (2012, p.95).  
 
To comparatively test the institutionalist theory of development by Acemoglu & Robinson, 
the following propositions about the cases are derived:  
 
1) The local economic institutions in Papua are more extractive than the economic 
institutions in East Kalimantan. 
 
2) The local political institutions in Papua are more extractive than the political 
institutions in East Kalimantan.  
 
3) The state has a stronger monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in East 
Kalimantan than in Papua 
7 
 
2. Methodology 
 
In this paper, a comparative case study is used in which two Indonesian regions are compared. 
The comparative case study will be carried out by means of qualitative research, analyzing the 
economic and political institutions of East Kalimantan and Papua. Case selection is based on 
most similar system design (MSSD), which means that the cases are similar, but differ on the 
dependent variable: development. The unit of analysis are the local levels of political and 
economic institutions in both regions. Papua and East Kalimantan share a lot of 
characteristics, but score very differently in terms of HDI. Taking into account the economic 
factors and the regional autonomy as a consequence of decentralization in Indonesia, both 
provinces are relevant cases that can shed light on the importance of local political and 
economic institutions. Through a MSSD, determining variables can be identified. Research 
will be carried out through the collection and analysis of datasets and databases of 
governments, nongovernmental organizations and research institutes, government documents, 
reports from transnational and nongovernmental organizations, and academic literature. 
The economic institutions are operationalised as property rights, and land grab is the 
indicator. The occurrence of land grab indicates that property rights are not enforced, which 
means that the economic institutions are extractive. According to the Eco Ruralis Association: 
“land grabbing can be defined as being the control (whether through ownership, lease, 
concession, contracts, quotas, or general power) of larger than locally-typical amounts of land 
by any person or entity (public or private, foreign or domestic) via any means (‘legal’ or 
‘illegal’) for purposes of speculation, extraction, resource control or commodification at the 
expense of peasant farmers, agroecology, land stewardship, food sovereignty and human 
rights” (Baker-Smit & Attila, 2016, p.2). If land grab occurs, there are no property rights, or 
they are not enforced or implemented. When economic institutions fail to protect property 
rights, they are extractive: structured by the few to extract resources from the many 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.430).  
The political institutions are operationalized based on pluralism, because pluralistic 
political institutions distribute political power broadly in society and subject it to constraints 
against power abuse (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.81). To analyze the level of pluralism in 
both regions, 3 indicators will be used: 1) women’s representation; 2) civil society; 3) 
corruption. If the political power rests with a broad coalition, and society is widely 
represented, there should be a sufficient degree of inclusiveness of women in parliament and 
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political positions. Most quota systems aim to ensure that women’s representation is at least 
20 to 30 percent in parliament or house of representatives (Tremblay, 2007, p.538). Moreover, 
the organization and power of civil society is an indicator of the dispersion of power in 
society. In inclusive institutions, civil society can organize and constrain the political 
institutions, but in extractive institutions civil society will be systematically repressed 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016, p.31). Additionally, the level of corruption is used as an 
indicator to analyze how much constraints there are to the abuse of power. If the political elite 
can abuse their power to enrich themselves, they will try to keep the political and economic 
systems extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.343). According to Transparency 
International: “corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, “What is Corruption”, 2018). In extractive institutions, corruption will be 
present because power is unchecked and brings financial gains; there is incentive for the elite 
to remain in power and the elite has the resource to achieve this through corrupt practices 
such as bribery (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.343). 
Furthermore, inclusive institutions need a degree of state capacity and a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of violence to enforce law and order, provide public services and encourage 
and regulate economic activities; without a monopoly on violence, inclusive institutions 
cannot develop, and states can descend into chaos (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp.80-81). 
Therefore, the third indicator is the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.  
 
3. Comparative case study 
 
Democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia 
 
This paragraph explains the power structure and different levels of government in Indonesia. 
There are three levels of autonomous regional government. The first level is the provincial 
government, which is headed by a governor and has its own regional assembly. The second 
level are the local governments comprised of districts/regencies and cities. They have their 
own local government and legislative body. Districts/regencies are headed by a regent, and 
cities are headed by a mayor. On the third level, the regencies and cities are divided into sub-
districts (International Business Publications, 2015 ,p.90). The 1999 decentralization laws 
gave local governments the right to grant investment licenses and make industrial policies, but 
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responsibility shifts to the province when investments involve more than one district (Rasyid, 
2003, p.69). When investment licenses regard oil, gas and mining resources containing high 
radioactive components, the national government has authority (Rasyid, 2003, p.69). Fiscal 
decentralization also took place. Local governments now receive a share of oil and gas 
revenues, and receive block grants from the General Allocation Fund (DAU). These DAU’s 
are distributed based on population size, area size, geographical location, income levels, and 
natural resource potential (Rasyid, 2003, p.68). Moreover, the central government provides 
Special Allocation Funds to the poorest regions for the improvement of public services such 
as education, health, transportation and water supply (Rasyid, 2003, p.68). 
The regional governments are very autonomous in Indonesia. The Regional People’s 
Legislative Assembly’s (DPRD’s) have the power to initiate, amend and pass local 
regulations, but need approval from the local government heads (Rasyid, 2003, p.67). With 
the power to elect their own government heads through the DPRD’s, regional communities 
gained sovereignty over their political affairs. While the local regents and mayors are directly 
elected, the members of the DPRD’s are not directly elected by the people. The electorate 
votes for political parties, and the political parties choose the representatives for the DPRD 
(Colongon, 2003, p.98). Because members of the local parliaments are not directly elected by 
the people, they lack the incentive to be responsive to the electorate, and there is no 
accountability mechanism (Colongon, 2003, p.98). 
 
Papua: a persistent vicious circle 
 
Papua is the easternmost province in Indonesia. Currently, it has the lowest HDI of the 
country at 59.09 (BPS, 2017). Papua is stuck in a vicious circle, and the severely extractive 
political and economic institutions can be identified as causes of underdevelopment in Papua. 
Besides the poorest, Papua is also one of the most violent regions; there has been an 
independence struggle since Indonesia absorbed Papua in 1969 (Anderson, 2015, XIII). 
Together with the province Papua Barat, Papua was colonized by the Dutch, and had the name 
Netherlands New Guinea (Timmer, 2008, p.25). After Indonesia’s declaration of 
independence in 1945, the Dutch maintained control of Netherlands New Guinea and 
promised them independence. However, in 1962 the territory was transferred to Indonesia 
under the 1962 New York Agreement (McGibbon, 2003, p.195). Since Indonesian takeover, 
armed resistance emerged, such as the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) (McGibbon, 2003, 
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p.195). The central government eventually granted Papua a Special Autonomy Law that 
vested power in the provincial government to manage its own affairs (Indonesia: Law No.21 
of 2001, On Special Autonomy for the Papua Province, 2001). However, the majority of the 
Papuan community rejected the special autonomy as a substitute for independence 
(McGibbon, 2003, p.199).  
Large-scale land grab 
Papua is stuck in the mechanisms of a vicious circle. Extractive economic institutions 
are supported by the elites securing their power to benefit from the extraction (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, p.372). Papua has very extractive economic institutions and suffers from 
large-scale land grab by the state and private companies, and the facilitation of this by the 
local governments. The province of Papua has abundant natural resources with a large mining 
sector, agricultural sector, plantation, forestry and fishery. After independence, the state has 
granted concessions to companies on indigenous lands, and Papua has had conflicts over land 
rights (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2002, p.1). De jure, the 2001 Special Autonomy law 
gave Papua more control over and access to its economic resources, and recognizes the 
customary law (adat) and the communal ownership of land (ulayat) in Papua (Indonesia: Law 
No.21 of 2001, Special Autonomy for the Papua Province, 2001). This recognition means that 
investors are obliged by law to negotiate with traditional landowners over the use of the land 
(McGibbon, 2003, p.200). The rich natural resources are very valuable to the government, 
military and business elites, and a strong incentive for the central government to keep control 
over Papua (ICG, 2002, p.1). The management of natural resources remains contested: Papua 
insists that the Special Autonomy Law gave the provincial government the authority over 
concessions, but the central government argues that the ministries should retain the right to 
issue concessions (Resosudarmo & Jotzo, 2009, p.25).  
De facto, the Papua Special Autonomy Law is largely ineffective due to a failure of 
implementation and a lack of required implementation laws and actions (Habtom, 2013, p.2). 
Local governments are reluctant to recognize adat land, because it is designated for 
concessions or other investments. Thus, legally recognizing adat land is not in the interest of 
the local government, and they often facilitate land grabbing by working closely with 
investors and corporate actors (Dewi, 2016, p.90). The Governor of Papua issued a Decree 
requiring legal recognition by the local government or formal affiliation with a legally 
constituted community cooperative to get a permit to manage customary forests (Tokede, 
2005, p.3). Therefore, communities formed Community Participation Cooperatives called 
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Kopermas to exercise their land rights and benefit from natural resources (Tokede, 2005, p.3). 
Yet, a lack of capital and knowledge about concession management forced the local 
communities to make deals with companies, concession holders and private investors, which 
resulted in the exploitation of a lot of these communities (Tokede, 2005, p.3).  
Papua suffers from very large-scale land grab. A lack of property rights does not allow 
and encourage people to participate in economic activities (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
p.75). In the southern district of Merauke, the state initiated agricultural modernisation 
project, the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE), is threatening local 
communities and human rights. The megaproject claims to use land for the cultivation of food 
crops to provide for Indonesia’s food security, and promised social development and 
economic aid. However, the local government has given out permits to investors and 
companies for over half of the total hectare of land in the Merauke district without the consent 
of the local communities (Dewi, 2016, p.88-91). Moreover, these permits demonstrate that the 
involved companies are planning monoculture plantations for oil palm, sugar and industrial 
tree plantations instead of food crops (Awasmifee, 2012, p.13). Involved companies such as 
Medco, Rajawali and Korindo groups have already begun logging, and millions of hectares of 
forests have been destructed, dispossessing thousands of people from their lands (Awasmifee, 
2012, p.14). As a result of the large-scale land grab, irreparable damage has been done. The 
local communities living on that land are the Malind Anim clans, who live off the land on 
sago, fish and wild animals (Awasmifee, 2012, p.5). MIFEE is threatening their survival, and 
brought malnutrition and extreme deprivation to the Malind communities by destroying their 
land and livelihood (The Borneo Project, 2013; Awasmifee, 2012, pp.5-12; Habtom, 2013, 
p.5).  
The concentration of wealth and power due to the extractive institutions increases the 
stakes of the political game and leads to infighting (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.95). This 
mechanism is visible in another important case of land grab in Papua’s mining sector, 
involving a private company, the central state and the military. In the southwestern district of 
Mimika, Freeport Indonesia, part of U.S. company Freeport McMoRan operates one of the 
biggest copper and gold mines in the world: the Grasberg mine (Freeport McMoRan, 2018). 
Freeport is very valuable to the Indonesian government, military and business elites: it is the 
country’s biggest tax payer, brought large revenues, paid the military millions of dollars, and 
financed Suharto’s regime since 1967 as an integral part of his patronage network (ICG, 2002, 
p.2; Leith, 2003, p.4). In 1967, 1991 and 1994, Freeport obtained Contracts of Work from the 
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central government without having to compensate landowners such as the Amungme and 
Komoro tribes (McKenna, 2015, p.94). By the early nineties, Indonesia had no interest in the 
welfare of Papuans. Freeport became the de-facto local government in Papua, providing 
development, administration and services in the area (Leith, 2003, p.4). They built schools, 
health clinics, infrastructure, houses, an airstrip, a port, and even a company town called 
Tembagapura (ICG, 2002, p.18). The developments caused in inter-tribal conflicts and 
increasing tension in the communities (Leith, 2003, p.8). Conflicts over land and the 
Indonesian takeover caused Freeport to pay the TNI millions of dollars for their security, and 
the area became one of the most militarized zones in the country (Leith, 2003, p.8). In 2001, 
erupting local tensions and international pressure forced the company to compensate the 
Amungme and Komoro tribes for their displacement (McKenna, 2015, p.95). Freeport’s 
relation with the state and the military is a crucial element of the vicious circle in Papua: their 
extractive economic resources are enriching a small elite of the state and military, who are 
therefore invested in keeping the system extractive.  
 
Narrowly distributed power and resources 
Women’s representation 
Since women represent 50 percent of the population, women’s participation in 
processes of growth contribute to the inclusiveness of growth (Kabeer, 2012, p.4). Gender 
equality is a crucial priority for development: when women are denied participation in 
political and decision-making processes, they also have reduced access to education, health, 
land, economic resources and technology, while legislatures with more female representatives 
are more likely to promote gender equality (UN DESA, 2015, p.66). In the Regional 
Representative Council of the Republic Indonesia, women’s representation is 0%: all 4 
Papuan representatives are male (DPD Republik Indonesia, 2018). In the House of 
Representatives of the Republic Indonesia, only 1 out of 9 Papuan representatives is female 
(DPR Republik Indonesia, 2018). In Papua’s provincial parliament (DPRD), 7 of the 55 
(12,73%) representatives are female (DPRD Papua, 2018). All top leadership positions are 
occupied by men (Provinsi Papua, 2016). Moreover, of the 58 leadership positions for regent 
and deputy regent in Papua, only 1 position is occupied by a woman (Provinsi Papua, 2016). 
Thus, in Papua, women’s representation in the political process is extremely low: the political 
power rests with a small group of male elites. 
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However, the Papua Special Autonomy Law mandates affirmative action policies, and 
stablished the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP), comprising of 42 Papuan members from 
adat communities, women’s organizations and religious institutions (McGibbon, 2003, 
p.200). The MRP is an important application of affirmative action: “by means of 
compensatory preferential treatment is expected to promote inclusion and facilitate equal 
opportunities for the groups which had suffered from discrimination, including ethnic 
minorities and women” (Sugandi, 2008, p.9). The MRP has the mandate to review and veto 
candidate selection for the governor position, implement regulations related to Special 
Autonomy, and hold the district and provincial governments accountable for policies that may 
violate the rights of Papuans (McGibbon, 2003, p.200). Nevertheless, the MRP does not have 
the authority to control the development process, preventing the MRP to exercise its mandate 
to protect the rights of Papuans in the development process (Sugandi, 2008, p.9). However, 
quotas are not enough to ensure gender equality if they are adopted in isolation (UN DESA, 
015, p.67). Despite the existence of a gender quota, the political institutions in Papua are 
extractive. Only when power is widely dispersed in decision-making processes, the idea that 
everyone should be treated equally starts making sense (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.306). 
A lack of pluralism makes it easier for elites to accumulate power. Pluralism requires political 
power to be widely distributed and requires a process of empowerment to go from extractive 
to inclusive political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.458). 
Civil society 
In Papua, civil society is not as active and free as in the other regions of Indonesia. 
Civil society is important, because without their ability to coordinate the people’s demands, 
opposition movements can be crushed by the elites in power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
p.460). Empowerment of the population is very hard without free media being able to provide 
information about power abuses (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.461). Papuans are not 
allowed to organize freely, and are frequently arrested for participation in peaceful 
demonstrations (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p.9). However, in the last decade, civil society 
organizations started to play an increasingly significant role in Papuan politics and policy 
(Timmer, 2008, p.34). Civil society in Papua consists of religious organizations, adat 
organizations, NGO’s, media and educational institutions (Sugandi, 2008, p.18). However, the 
necessary space for international journalists and agencies to report on the situation is not 
there. International NGO’s like Cordaid, the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Peace Brigades International were banned from Papua by the Indonesian government on the 
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grounds of allegedly supporting Papuan separatism, and in 2015 the government forced 
international NGO’s such as Oxfam into closure by not renewing their permits (Fauzi, 2015). 
Indonesia claims that Papua is open to foreign media as of 2015, but most journalists are still 
denied access based on visa denials (Kine, 2017). Civil society is so repressed in Papua, they 
do not have the power to constrain the political institutions. 
 
Corruption 
There is widespread corruption in Papua, indicating that there is little accountability 
and constraints to power abuses. The political elites abuse their power for private gain, which 
is an incentive to keep the institutions extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.343). The 
local governments in Papua are regarded as the worst administered in Indonesia;  the head of 
the election ethics board assessed the 2014 legislative elections, and concluded that Papua 
cannot be held to the same standard as the other regions since the majority of Papuan election 
officials would have to be fired if they were to be held to the same standards (IPAC, 2017, 
p.14). Provincial election commissioners have routinely been cited for misconduct, and voter 
rolls have been found to contain fictitious names (IPAC, 2017, p.14). Moreover, voter turnout 
is low because brokers already determined the outcome before the polling day, and candidates 
win based on clan membership, having powerful political backing, having more cash to 
distribute than rivals, or having control over the election process (IPAC, 2017, p.14). The 
Special Autonomy development budget has been misallocated by the local elites and turned 
into a fight for money (Sumule in Alhamid, Ballard & Kanowski, 2009, p.149). Furthermore, 
there is no trickle-down effect of Special Autonomy to ensure access to basic rights for 
indigenous Papuans; they don’t see benefits. Instead, the local political elites and bureaucracy 
(both Papuan and non-Papuan) are reaping the benefits, creating an even wider social gap 
between the rich elites and the poor (Sugandi, 2008, p.15). Being a government official is not 
perceived as serving the public, but as a way to enrich oneself: most government officials 
suddenly owned luxurious houses and vehicles after their appointment to local office 
(Sugandi, 2008, p.15). Corruption is so widespread, that auditing standards are poor on all 
regional government levels (IPAC, 2013, pp.8-9). In local governments with access to 
considerable resources, corruption can crowd out actual spending on public service delivery to 
such an extent that public service access gets worse (Lewis, 2017, p.1703). Many districts 
build new government buildings, but most of them are half empty and local officials don’t 
show up. Despite the development funds, performance in social service delivery is extremely 
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low. A lot of schools and health clinics were built to grant clan members construction 
contracts in return for kickbacks, and are left vacant afterwards (Bachelard, 2015).  
Furthermore, local elites driven by resources and status are further dividing the 
administrative units of the province (IPAC, 2013, p.1). The local governments in Papua are 
very dependent on the General Allocation Fund (DAU) contributing 70 percent of 
government revenues (IPAC, 2013, p.4). Because allocation of this fund is based on 
population and area, it rewards areas with smaller populations, creating a strong incentive for 
local elites to divide Papua (IPAC, 2013, p.4). Moreover, 60 percent of finances allocated to 
Papua under Special Autonomy are distributed to all districts (IPAC, 2013, p.5). This dividing 
has worsened governance, corruption and conflicts in Papua (IPAC, 2013, p.8).  
No monopoly on violence 
Papua’s government does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Without 
a monopoly on violence, inclusive institutions cannot develop because it hinders the 
enforcement of law and order, the provision of public services and the regulation of economic 
activity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.80). Papuan separatist fighters such as the OPM, 
continue to use violence and fight the Indonesian state (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p.6). 
Additionally, the security forces are not perceived as legitimate amongst the Papuans; the 
state even appointed a military commander to Papua’s capital, who was indicted twice for 
human rights violations in East Timor (Sugandi, 2008, p.21).  
 
Moreover, there is little accountability of the military and police. The TNI continues to 
take harsh measures against peaceful activists and police violence involves physical abuse, 
harassment and intimidation (Sugandi, 2008, p.22). In 2016, thousands of Papuans were 
arrested for demonstrating for a new referendum on independence (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2018, p.11). In most Indonesian provinces, local power holders and military commands 
cooperate. In Papua however, the military gained so much control, that some civilian 
administrations have become irrelevant, lost control of the force, and are in conflict with the 
TNI (Mietzner, 2003, p.254). In Timika, where Freeport is located, the TNI is so autonomous 
in business and security operations, they do not need power-sharing agreements with the local 
government, while Timika’s government is campaigning for the TNI’s removal out of the area 
(Mietzner, 2003, p.255).  
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East Kalimantan: breaking the mold 
 
East Kalimantan is located in the east of the island Borneo. It’s one of the richest 
regions in Indonesia, and has a higher than average HDI of 75.12 (BPS, 2017). The legal 
framework for decentralization in the province of East Kalimantan is the Law N.22/1999 on 
regional governance, Law N.25/1999 on the financial balance between central and regional 
governments, and Law N.25/2000 on the implementing regulation for the decentralization law 
(Colongon, 2003, p.92). East Kalimantan is divided in 10 districts: Pasir, Kutai Barat, Kutai 
Kartanegara, Kutai Timur, Berau, Penajam Paser Utara, Balikpapan, Samarinda, Bontang, and 
Mahakam Ulu (BPS Provinsi Kalimantan Timur, 2015).  
 
East Kalimantan has a history of economic growth under extractive economic 
institutions. East Kalimantan is very profitable for its natural resources: 8.1 million hectare of 
forest land has been acquired by timber companies, 67 coal mining agreements have been 
signed and 500 mining permits issued for a total of 3.08 hectare (Chao, Kleden, Raja, 
Wardhana & Cinditiara, 2013, p.125). The large coal mining sector in East Kalimantan dates 
back to the time of Dutch colonization when it was exploited for the shipping industry, but the 
real coal mining boom began in the late 1980’s (Funfgeld, 2016, p.149). During Suharto’s 
centralistic authoritarian regime, East Kalimantan’s resources were exploited to such a high 
degree, that it caused severe environmental degradation and set in motion processes of 
political, social and economic change (Haug, 2007, p.3). Since decentralization in 2001, the 
local governments gained the authority to issue licenses and profit from the revenues, and the 
region experienced another boom of resource exploitation (Haug, 2007, p.3). There was a 
significant rise in the issuance of mining permits. In the eastern municipality of Samarinda, 
concessions comprised 71% of the total area (Funfgeld, 2016, p.151). 
 
In East Kalimantan, land grab occurs, and property rights are not consistently 
enforced. Currently, East Kalimantan has different laws and regulations on multiple levels 
regarding land rights of customary communities. However, due to contradicting restrictions, 
land rights of customary communities are still weak (Urano, 2014, p.8). The Ministry of 
Agrarian Affairs issued Regulation N.5/1999 to solve the problem of Ulayat Rights of 
Customary Law Communities, which gives district governments instructions how to deal with 
customary land right claims (Urano, 2014, p.8). Multiple regulations issued by districts in 
East Kalimantan recognise the land rights of customary communities, but often they are not 
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recognised, because Regulation N.5/1999 states that customary land rights are not recognised 
when land is already owned and used by a third party under permission of state authority 
(Urano, 2014, p.8). Moreover, most indigenous communities lack the land titles or land 
statement letters required for land registration (Chao et al., 2013, p.128). Thus, powerful 
investors can still easily obtain large areas of land trough policies that incentivise land 
ownership for investment and business, without having to recognize customary law (Down to 
Earth, 2010, p.1).  
There are three main arrangements through which land grab occurs in East 
Kalimantan: incentivizing the leaders of local communities, trading the land for agreed upon 
benefits, and through Nucleas Estate Schemes. Firstly, it is a common practice for companies 
and investors in East Kalimantan to acquire land by approaching the leaders of indigenous 
communities and incentivize them with gifts and money so that they influence their 
community into accepting a palm oil plantation on their lands. Companies also acquire land 
rights by giving money to the indigenous leaders and the village elders, who then sign off the 
land rights of the whole community (Marti, Tarigan & Griffiths, 2008, p.91). However, a lot 
of communities have yet to receive the promised compensation. Numerous local communities 
handed over land to the oil palm company PT REA Kaltim, holding land allocations of almost 
100.000 hectares of land in East Kalimantan as of 2011 (Chao et al., 2013, p.130). A lot of 
these communities are still fighting the company to get the promised compensation for deals 
they made years ago (Chao et al., 2013, p.130). Secondly, oil palm companies and local 
communities make arrangements trading the land area for specified mutually agreed upon 
benefits for the people, such as employment. This is usually done through cooperatives 
(koperasis): legal entities established by local farmers (Urano, 2014, p.16). However, it 
regularly occurs that the koperasis do not act out of the local population’s interest, causing 
conflicts between the local population, the cooperatives and the company (Urano, 2014,p .17). 
Thirdly, land arrangements are made through Nucleas Estate Schemes: schemes where 80% 
of the plantation (the nucleus estate) is directly managed by a private or state-owned 
company, and the remaining 20%  is allocated to smallholders and farmers as plasma 
plantations of 2 or 3 hectare (Urano, 2014, p.12). However, most companies also manage the 
20% areas on behalf of the farmers for thirty-five years, after which they receive the 
remaining portion of the profit deducted by bank loans and management fees (Urano, 2014, 
p.12). Since 2005, these oil palm estates have increased exponentially. The large-scale oil 
palm estates are controlled by approximately 330 companies, holding permits for 1.2 million 
hectares of allocated land (Chao et al., 2013, pp.125-126). The occurrence of land grab, and 
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lack of secure property rights for the majority of the population, creates a high risk of 
expropriation and loss of output, which does not create incentives for the population to invest 
and increase productivity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.75). 
 
East Kalimantan experienced positive pressure in land tenure from civil society and 
the arrival of direct elections. NGO’s play an active role through informing local villages on 
land contracts. For example, the Dayak Modang community had close relations with NGO’s 
in the area, and rejected the deal for an oil palm plantation on their land (Urano, 2014,p .18). 
Moreover, the accountability resulting from the direct elections of local leaders have a 
positive effect on the recognition of customary land rights. For example, the southern district 
of Paser had an ongoing conflict between farmers and migrant workers. The farmers claimed 
customary land rights, while the migrants of the plantation company held an official land 
certificate. The regent of Paser refrained from taking a decision, causing the plantation’s oil 
palms to die, ruining the potential profit for the company and the potential compensation for 
the farmers (Bakker, 2009). This issue caused him to lose the subsequent elections to a rival 
who campaigned promising to restore Paser’s oil palm sector and improve the situation of the 
poor. Paser made a regulation recognizing customary land rights. Customary communities 
gained political influence through this government support, while the government gained a 
more positive reputation for supporting these groups (Bakker, 2009). Thus, East Kalimantan 
is slowly breaking the mold of the vicious circle it was stuck in since Dutch colonization. The 
extractive economic institutions are slowly transforming towards inclusive institutions, due to 
the influence of the developments in East Kalimantan’s political institutions.  
 
Increasing accountability in extractive political institutions 
Women’s representation 
East Kalimantan’s women representation is also low. In the Regional Representative 
Council of the Republic Indonesia, all 4 representatives are male (DPD Republik Indonesia, 
2018). In the House of Representatives of the Republic Indonesia, 3 out of 8 representatives 
(37,50%) from East Kalimantan are female (DPR Republik Indonesia, 2018). Moreover, in 
the provincial parliament, 6 out women out of 55 representatives (10,91%) is female (10,91%) 
(DPRD Kalimantan Timur, 2018). Additionally, there are no women in the provincial top 
leadership positions (Provinsi Kalimantan Timur, 2018). In the local top leadership positions, 
2 out of 10 regents or mayors (10%) is female, and none of the 10 vice-regents and vice-
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mayors is female (Samarinda, 2018; Balikpapan, 2018; Kutai Timur, 2018; Berau, 2018; 
Paser, 2018, Penajam Paser Utara, 2018; Kutai Barat, 2018; Mahakam Ulu, 2018; Bontang, 
2018; Kutai Kartanegara, 2018). The political power is not widely dispersed, but located in 
the hands of the male elite.  
Civil society 
There is a certain process of empowerment in motion in East Kalimantan. The 
province has freedom of association and assembly. Civil society is vibrant with a lot of 
advocacy groups, rights associations, labour unions and other organisations (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2018, p.9). Pluralism and a process of empowerment are two important elements to 
transform from extractive to inclusive political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
p.458). In an open system that allows independent media, it is easier for groups to organize 
themselves, mobilize opposition and provide information about possible power abuse and 
threats (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.333). Since decentralization, NGO’s have put 
pressure on the local government for their practices and management of natural resources, and 
were even able to influence local legislation in several areas. A grouping of NGO’s called the 
Alliance of Natural Resource Policy Observers (APKSA) delayed the draft of regional 
autonomy regulation, and succeeded in getting full consultation with the local government, 
after which the local legislation of the Kutai district was redrafted by the district assembly and 
government in cooperation with NGO members (Down to Earth, 2000). Moreover, civil 
society has influenced the situation of abandoned mine sites. After multiple children drowned 
in abandoned mining pits, the East Kalimantan Network for Mining Advocacy (JATAM) 
worked to gain access to permits and environmental impact assessment documents 
(AMDAL), which was granted by the Supreme Court in 2016 (Toumbourou & Surya Putra, 
2016). However, JATAM is still waiting to receive the documents, while the abandoned 
mining pits continue to take lives. In addition, NGO involvement together with the 
development of direct elections for regents and mayors, has made the political institutions 
more accountable to the population (Bakker, 2009). For example, the district of Paser planned 
to build a new boulevard, which required the removal of riverbank slums. The higher 
accountability through NGO activity and direct elections, made the district government 
realize it was more profitable to act in the interest of the population, and made a publicity 
stunt by paying the people living in the riverbank slums substantial amounts of money for 
their land (Bakker, 2009). In East Kalimantan, civil society is breaking the mold of the 
vicious circle by being a force against extractive political and economic institutions.  
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Corruption 
East Kalimantan experiences corruption, but also growing accountability. Corruption 
is one of the tools for the elite to keep themselves in power, and keep the institutions 
extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.343). A lack of defence against power abuse 
generates the vicious circle, making sure it persists (Acemoglu & Robison, 2012, p.344). 
However, constraints on how much power one person can accumulate, reduce the incentives 
for the elite to keep the political institutions extractive (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.309). 
The province is becoming more urbanised and welfare is improving, which increases the 
demand for accountability and effectiveness (Giap, Nurina & Mulya, 2015, p.369). However, 
there are many cases of corruption related to natural resources and investments. After 
decentralization, local politics reproduced the patronage networks that had existed during the 
Suharto era. For example, the former regent of the Kutai Kartanegara district dispensed 
favours through infrastructure projects and business licenses to keep ties with the bureaucracy 
and law enforcement. Funds for local development projects were embezzled, which involved 
an extensive number of officials from various institutions part of his patronage network 
(Evaquarta, 2010). Eventually they were held accountable, and 8 high positioned senior 
government officials have been arrested for corruption between 2004 and 2010, including the 
former regent, the deputy-regent, and the chairman and vice-chairman of the local assembly 
(Down to Earth, 2010, p.3). Furthermore, there was a lot of mining-related money politics. 
Particularly during local elections, candidates received financial support from mining 
companies who in turn received concessions after the elections (Funfgeld, 2016, p.151). A 
former governor of East Kalimantan was sentenced to 4 years in prison for issuing permits to 
open 1 million hectare of land for palm oil plantations for the Surya Dumai Group. He waived 
the company’s obligation to provide a bank guarantee, which caused the state a loss of 346.8 
billion Rupiah (Dermawan, Petkova, Sinaga, Muhajir & Indriatmoko, 2011, p.10). Thus, East 
Kalimantan experiences growing constraints on power, thereby lowering the amount of 
wealth and power a person can usurp, which can reduce the incentives to keep the political 
institutions extractive. 
A fragile monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
East Kalimantan has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A monopoly on 
violence is important to enforce the conditions of inclusive institutions, such as law and order, 
economic regulations and public services (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.80). However, 
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East Kalimantan government’s monopoly is under threat. The practices of private companies 
involved in coal mining have challenged the government’s monopoly on the use of force. 
Private companies bribe the local police to gain their support and repress anti-mining protests 
(Funfgeld, 2016, p.157). Indonesia National Human Rights Commission reports consistent 
abuse by the security forces acting out of commercial interests (Jacobson, 2014, p.50). 
Security forces have often inhibited demonstrations through threats of violence, but this often 
turned into physical violence (Funfgeld, 2016, p.152). Besides from bribing police officers, 
companies are increasingly employing paramilitary groups to protect their mining operations, 
but these groups threaten the local communities and exercise violence against them (Funfgeld, 
2016, p.157). These paramilitary groups are formally registered as civil society organizations 
and use visual similarities to the national military to legitimate their existence and actions 
(Funfgeld, 2016, p.157). For East Kalimantan’s development, it is important that the 
monopoly on force is retained. A loss of this monopoly can stop the developments towards 
inclusivity, and result in chaos (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.81). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Concluding, Acemoglu & Robinson’s institutionalist theory of development holds 
explanatory power to account for the diverging trajectories of development in East 
Kalimantan and Papua. The process of decentralisation and democratisation gave the regions 
a lot of autonomy, and created differences between their institutions. The case studies 
demonstrate a significant difference in their economic and political institutions, and the 
monopoly on violence. 
Proposition 1 holds true: the local economic institutions in Papua are more extractive 
than the economic institutions in East Kalimantan. The economic institutions in Papua are 
severely extractive: the province suffers from land grab on a very large-scale by private and 
state-actors such as Freeport McMoran and the state-initiated MIFEE project. East 
Kalimantan’s economic institutions are extractive, but civil society and direct elections are 
pressuring towards more inclusivity. Land grab by private companies still occurs, and laws 
and regulations are contradictory and often not enforced. However, civil society and elections 
generate more accountability in the political institutions and economic activities. 
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Proposition 2 holds true: the political institutions in Papua are more extractive than the 
political institutions in East Kalimantan. Papua’s political institutions are extremely 
extractive. Even though, de jure, Papua has affirmative action policies, de facto, this is not 
implemented. The political institutions are not pluralistic. Women are barely represented in 
politics and decision-making processes, civil society is frequently repressed and denied 
access, and corruption is so widespread and severe that Papua cannot even be held to the same 
ethical standards as Indonesia’s other regions, and it crowds out public service delivery. The 
concentration of political power is so narrow, and the accountability so low, that the elite has 
the resources and power to keep the economic institutions extractives and remain in power. In  
East Kalimantan, the political institutions are less extractive than in Papua, because there is a 
higher degree of accountability and the political power is less concentrated. Women’s 
representation is also low in East Kalimantan, but civil society differs significantly. Being free 
and able to organize, civil society is an important pressure in the province’s transformation 
towards more inclusivity by influencing the political process, constraining power abuses by 
the elite and increasing accountability. Moreover, the direct elections also improve 
accountability. Corruption was a widespread problem, but increasing accountability and 
constraints are decreasing corruption. Because the amount of power and resources that the 
elite can usurp is declining, and there are constraints to power abuse, the incentives to keep 
the East Kalimantan’s institutions extractive are declining. 
Proposition 3 holds true: the state has a stronger monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence in East Kalimantan than in Papua. Papua does not have a monopoly on the use of 
force. Separatist fighters such as the OPM are using violence in their goal for independence. 
Local governments have lost control over the military because they are so powerful in Papua, 
and they are not seen as legitimate by the population because of human rights violations. Even 
though it is fragile, East Kalimantan has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and is 
therefore able to enforce law and order, provide public services and regulate economic 
activities. 
Even though both regions have extractive political and economic institutions, the 
differences in the institutions have a significant effect on the development of both regions. 
While Papua is stuck in a vicious circle, East Kalimantan is breaking the mold. Papua has 
severely extractive economic and political institutions, and the lack of accountability and 
constraints against power abuse create a vicious circle. The very extractive political 
institutions lead to extractive economic institutions and distributes power and resources in the 
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hands of a small Papuan and non-Papuan elite. These resources and power are used by the 
elite to remain in power, and enables them to keep the institutions extractive. Additionally, the 
fact that Papua does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use force greatly undermines any 
form of development towards inclusiveness, since this is needed to enforce law and order. On 
the other hand, East Kalimantan is slowly breaking the mold. The province has extractive 
economic and political institutions, and has experienced unsustainable growth under 
extractive institutions. However, certain forces have been slowly breaking this vicious circle, 
making the institutions more inclusive. There are more constraints on the abuse and 
accumulation of power and wealth, political power is getting more widely distributed, and the 
rule of law is increasingly enforced. When these characteristics arise, it also leads to more 
inclusive economic institutions, and decreases the incentives to re-create extractive political 
institutions in East Kalimantan. Thus, Acemoglu & Robinson’s theory keeps holding 
explanatory power when it is applied to regional comparison within a country. 
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